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The pressure to take at least partial or temporary residency on the high moral ground 
is quite considerable in our profession. One might cite standards and commitment to 
truth in research or provision of the best possible guidance for students as key 
humanist motivators. For those who have had a ‘humanist’ education or who clearly 
see the human virtues of learning, there is the temptation to intuitively applaud 
humanism and, certainly, it is difficult to renounce it in toto. To do so is to court 
suggestions that you are somehow ‘against’ humans, a nihilist or, worse, a pessimist. 
It is to be a debaser of all that is good and of value in either the human essence or, for 
the more philosophically circumspect, in human interaction. Very few state that they 
are against humanism and very many profess that they are definitely humanists of one 
sort or another. It is part and parcel of being nice, the bandwagon of positivity which 
may or may not complement academic considerations. Of course, in the arts, politics 
and social life, there have been movements in the last century or so that have 
putatively renounced humanism, often for greater or lesser rhetorical effect. The 
movement of this kind that influenced me in my formative years was punk rock – a 
strategic, but strongly felt, renunciation of the unholy alliance of the establishment in 
general, business in particular and the music business especially. As a subculture, it 
was particularly successful – irrespective of later outcomes - in challenging a tired 
socio-political consensus in the UK (and the West). It brought into serious question a 
set of unquestioned values – for example, regarding race, gender, sexuality, 
respectability, diversity and tolerance – that have been comprehensively co-opted 
since by social democratic governments. And it effectively outlawed ‘progressive 
rock’. The other formative influence I should mention here is reading Althusser as an 
undergraduate. Despite the fact that Althusser’s work was now open to question as the 
news broke that he had murdered his wife, his theoretical anti-humanism overturned 
everything I had considered to be common sense, even in the post-punk environment. 
Such adolescent experiences of revelation are sometimes difficult to work 
through; so I have to admit that all these years later I remain suspicious of humanism 
and I am committed to an anti-humanist perspective. Obviously, that sounds very 
negative – defining oneself as being against something rather than for something. 
Moreover, in an environment where humanist positions are so entrenched that they 
are as taken-for-granted as fresh air, it may appear as though an ‘anti’ perspective has 
nothing to offer. Indeed, this seems to be very much the predicament of Roy Harris, 
certainly from his 1978 inaugural lecture onwards, as he persuasively and vigorously 
took apart the ‘language myth’. Pitted against an academic establishment - and 
institutionalisation of linguistics especially - which was unlikely to see that there was 
any problem to consider since everything seemed to be working so well, the 
integrationist effort was always going to be an uphill struggle. By contrast, modern 
quasi-critical intellectual endeavours such as post-structuralism have met with 
immense success, largely because, for all their calls for new ways of thinking, they 
have been complicit with existing academic agendas and have simply acted as a 
Spring clean, allowing certain disciplines to stage a brief clear-out before proceeding 
with business as usual. An integrational semiology, on the other hand, may have 
entailed ripping up some things and starting again from scratch. A vivid analogy 
might be the profession of burglary withstanding a spirited denunciation 
encompassing a critique of its methods, but completely missing the point of a more 
wholesale denunciation that called for burglars to immediately desist. 
Having introduced this admittedly fairly slight kinship between Harris’ 
Herculean exposure of the language myth and the challenge of anti-humanism, it is 
perhaps worth declaring some other interests which render my perspective at odds 
with humanism but not by any means opposed to positions espoused in the 
contributions to this volume. Firstly, I became aware of the integrationist endeavour 
early in my involvement in semiotics and I was struck by the stress on the role of the 
laity at a time when media and cultural studies had rediscovered the importance of 
studying audiences and reception. Secondly, an integrationist perspective entailed a 
challenge to the idea of fixed codes, an issue that was becoming crucial to semiotics’ 
own self-reflexive vision. Thirdly, to be an integrationist was to be concerned with 
communication rather than language (see, especially, Harris 2003); thus, fourthly, as 
semiotics was beginning to realize, the main concern was semiosis rather than the 
individual sign. Fifthly, in an integrationist view the world could not be seen as 
‘constructed in discourse’ as the ‘linguistic turn’ and semiology – but not the 
emerging semiotics – would have it. Sixthly, and following on, the human subject was 
agentive in the integrationist formulation; far from being the ‘bearer’ of structures or 
functions as structural Marxism had held, or determined by language, the human’s 
agency was central to meaning-making. With the emergence of biosemiotics from the 
early 1990s onwards, adumbrating a vision of agency throughout nature, I saw the 
projects of integrationism and semiotics as allied. Some of this is reflected in the 
contribution to this book by Conrad (pp.    ) and certainly in Pablé and Hutton (2015). 
However, it is this alliance which also prevents me from immediately subscribing to a 
humanist evaluation of the integrational project. Hopefully, I can expand on this 





Running through all the contributions to this volume is the insistence that signs are 
‘radically indeterminate’ (see the first mention of it in the essay on ‘Secular humanist 
discourses on rationality’, by Pablé, above, pp.    ). Contemporary semiotics, in 
general, shares the same view. As it is a broad school, some parts of semiotics still 
cling to determinacy and, certainly in the 1960s, many were guilty of excessive 
credulity towards determinacy in communication – as Umberto Eco said shortly 
before his death, they had “pissed code” (Kull and Velmezova 2016). Orman, in this 
volume, notes the linguistic hypertrophy in the term ‘fixed codes’, against which 
integrationists have long railed. Thus,  
 
the ‘fixed’ part of that description is largely superfluous since the notion of an 
unfixed, i.e. indeterminate, code undermines the original theoretical purpose 
which the postulation of the code was designed to serve, namely the 
guaranteeing of intersubjectivity in linguistic communication (Orman pp.       ).  
 
In pursuing the relation of an integrationist perspective to a humanist one, this is an 
important point because it deftly illustrates how the positing of an abstract code 
vitiates agency in favour of the system, in the manner of Saussure as well as 
Benveniste and Jakobson after him. Yet there is a wider picture to consider. I would 
argue that the idea of code is an anthropomorphism based, historically, on pragmatic 
implementation of cryptography. In nature, there are some codes that apparently 
function by dint of determinacy: the immune code, the genetic code, the neural code 
and the metabolic code. However, even with these ‘master’ codes, their seeming 
determinacy is itself by no means unassailable, any more than it is with the ‘verbal 
code’ (Cobley 2016). Harris’ insistence on ‘communication’ and its co-temporality 
deliberately took the focus of the argument away from ‘language’. Similarly, as can 
be seen with the career of one of the key figures in the development of contemporary 
semiotics, Thomas A. Sebeok, it was the movement from linguistics to general sign 
study that finally dissolved ‘code’. Originally adhering to Jakobson’s insistence on 
distinctive features as the ‘universal building blocks of language’, Sebeok moved 
through animal communication studies to global semiotics, steadily loosening the 
definition and grip of coding (Cobley 2014). In his later writings Sebeok referred to a 
proliferation of ‘cultural’ and ‘natural’ codes, from those in specific film genres to 
those in the social world of cats. He also treated the term ‘code’ as a synonym for 
‘interpretant’ (see, for example, 2001: 80 and 191 n. 13), the Peircean term for 
bringing forth a sign relationship and opening it up for further interpretation and 
further sign generation. It is understandable that, in the war against the language myth 
(in which we are involved), that Orman might take issue with this indeterminate 
version of code as developed by Sebeok; after all, the point is to re-introduce agency 
in the face of the ossification that sets in with the scientistic notion of code. Yet, might 
it not equally be the point to stress that agency interrupts the very conceptualization of 
code, rendering it a rule that everybody knows is to be broken? Certainly, Harris did 
not shrink from using ‘communication’, a concept which actually implies code 
success but which most people know also entails miscommunication and failure. In 
these instances, the faultiness of reified concepts offers somewhat of an opportunity 
for an agentive integrationist impetus. 
The agentive aspect of all communication, even that involving supposedly 
fixed codes in the sphere of language, is what is emphasized in Warner’s idea of 
“human semantic labour” as it is to be “distinguished from syntactic labour and 
machine computational processes, in contrast to the otherwise dominant assimilation 
of the human to the formal and to the machine in linguistics (Sperber and Wilson 
1986) and cognitive science (Johnson-Laird 1988)” (see above, pp.      ). In his 
persuasive argument, Warner sees the possibility of a humanistic reassertion of 
semantic autonomy in the face of syntactic sovereignty. Certainly, in formulating the 
design features of language Hockett (1963), too, seemed to have a similar vision for 
semanticity. Yet, in considering semantic labour – in much the same way as one might 
embrace the paradox of an ‘indeterminate code’ – there is a need to return to the 
matter of whether semantics and syntactics (and the labour associated with them) can 
be separated. The only place where they can be so divorced is in linguistics under the 
yoke of the language myth. Moreover, if one is looking to extrapolate about wider 
issues from observing linguistic structure – in sum: looking for linguistic structure – 
as opposed to looking at how humans use communication or what language is for, 
then results are always going to be limited and self-perpetuating. Treating language in 
terms of the formal system which seems to organize its manifestations is of a piece 
with approaching it with an engineering model, argues Deacon (2016). From the 
perspective of the evolution of language, he observes that language and language 
abilities have evolved spontaneously; unsurprisingly, therefore, identifying linguistic 
units as the building blocks of language is misplaced. For Deacon, cognitive, semiotic 
and pragmatic structures generate linguistic units; elementary phonetic and 
morphological elements of language are “late-stage developments” (2016: 4-5). He 
also makes this point with reference to brain development, demonstrating that cortical 
and language functions can only be understood in process terms, that the language 
function develops in a manner homologous to sensory and motor processing in 
general and, especially important, that the linguistic phrase is a semiotic, not 
linguistic, unit because it is lodged in a process involving the constraint of an index 
that enables symbolic reference. Segregationist linguistic theory starts from the 
symbol. What is crucial here is not just the embedding of ‘linguistic units’ in semiotic 
processes but the fact that the ‘linguistic unit’ - which is always a broader semiotic 
unit in any case - could never make reference if it was not bound to an indexical 
operation. That indexical operation, implying a communicative-interactive act rather 
than merely a symbolic one, locates the linguistic sign not just in pragmatics, but also 
in semiotics (and certainly not in syntactics). We will return to this semiotic bearing 
and its consequences for humanism, below. 
For the moment, let us consider further the matter of determinacy versus 
radical indeterminacy, as well as code versus interpretation. In contemporary 
semiotics, Peirce is held to be the exemplar of an interpretative rather than code-based 
semiotics. Yet, Jones (above, pp.    ) refers to Peirce as the progenitor of the type-
token distinction, a variant of coding that is discussed by Hutton and runs through the 
entirety of Harris (1996). In the latter, Harris (1996: 10) notes that the type-token 
distinction can be employed in a number of different ways and he refers to its origin 
in Peirce’s discussion of the work of a typesetter. Peirce (5.437) writes, 
 
There will ordinarily be about twenty the’s on a page, and of course they count 
as twenty words. In another sense of the word “word,” however, there is but one 
word “the” in the English language; and it is impossible that this word should 
lie visibly on a page or be heard in any voice, for the reason that it is not a 
Single thing or Single event. It does not exist; it only determines things that do 
exist. Such a definitely significant Form, I propose to term a Type. A Single 
event which happens once and whose identity is limited to that one happening 
or a Single object or thing which is in some single place at any one instant of 
time, such event or thing being significant only as occurring just when and 
where it does, such as this or that word on a single line of a single page of a 
single copy of a book, I will venture to call a Token. 
 
Apart from establishing the type-token distinction, this passage demonstrates two 
things. The first is that you should be careful when choosing examples: Peirce shifts 
from an arena of purely quantitative measures (typesetting) to a qualitative domain of 
meaning, thus setting himself up for admonishment by commentators who recognize 
this a century of linguistics later. The second is partly contained in the first – that is, 
different rules apply in the qualitative domain from the quantitative realm of 
scientism. This is part of the point that Harris seeks to make and he does it very 
competently, of course. However, what Harris and others overlook is that Peirce 
(4.537) also introduces a third term in the next sentence 
 
An indefinite significant character such as a tone of voice can neither be called 
a Type nor a Token. I propose to call such a Sign a Tone; In order that a Type 
may be used, it has to be embodied in a Token which shall be a sign of the 
Type, and thereby of the object the Type signifies.  
 
Arguably, an integrationist would not disagree with this sentence as a whole and 
certainly not before the word “which” occurs. A Tone appears at first glance to be the 
kind of reification that is proposed in pragmatics; yet, clearly, it is more in the manner 
of ‘indefinite significance’ of the kind that characterizes the communicative acts of 
the laity as emphasized in integrationism. 
We will return to this matter, below, but the binary version is certainly how the 
type-token distinction on its own seems to work in segregational linguistics and, in 
this context, Jones is right to remind us of Hutton’s observation that the abstract 
linguistic system is necessarily ‘independent of context’ or ‘decontextualized’ (1990: 
141). However – and this is of importance when we consider the relation of an 
integrationist approach and humanism – the distinction is not to be dismissed as 
further evidence of the deleterious effects of the reification of code, nor should we 
abandon the ambition to maintain context in its rightful place within communication. 
Used in linguistics, the type-token distinction either proceeds from an a priori 
idealisation of the type which draws on tokens for support; alternatively, it observes 
an accumulation of tokens in order to theorize an ideal type. More broadly applied, 
however, the distinction can be treated in a subtly different fashion. For example, 
Sebeok (1979a: 42) writes of the human propensity to classify, a much neglected 
activity in evolutionary accounts because the tokens of this propensity are usually 
taken on their own terms. So, in biology, reading the tokens as evidence of a type can 
reveal important insights – for example, biological function in seemingly unimportant 
recurring activities. In linguistics, reading the tokens as evidence of a type completely 
fails to account for the efficacy of the tokens in themselves and their independence – 
as is the case of so much communication – of an idealized structure. Much 
communication shares this characteristic with linguistic semiosis; yet, in an 
evolutionary frame, the relation between the recursive tendency of language, the 
infinite number of exchanges which might give rise to meaning and the relatively 
limited repertoires of various forms of communication from which it has, in part, 
evolved (e.g. gesture), needs to be considered. Moreover, any contention that context 
can be other than central, or actually posterior, to communicative acts must be 
misguided. Sebeok (1991: 30) states that context “refers to the organism’s cognizance 
of conditions and manner of appropriate and effective use of messages”, adding, that 
it 
 
includes the whole range of the animal’s cognitive systems (that is, ‘mind’), 
messages flowing parallel, as well as the memory of prior messages that have 
been processed or experience and, no doubt, the anticipation of future messages 
expected to be brought into play. 
 
Couching the matter in this way, with context at the very forefront of organisms’ (not 
just humans’) communication, suggests that decontextualization is the toxic gift of the 
language myth. It also suggests to me that ‘humanizing’ the communication process, 
stressing the individuality of every communicative transaction, is not necessarily the 
best way to promote context or an integrationist perspective on it. We will return to 
this point. For now, Hayes’ argument in this respect seems to warrant amplification. 
His comments on ‘linguistic governance’ (pp.    ) clearly implicate the language myth. 
Indeed, the restrictive legislation, speech codes, ‘no platform policies’ and censorship 
to which he alludes, along with the “citizen-as-victim”, have a long history, going 
back as far as the so-called ‘War of the Words’ (Dunant 1994) that installed political 
correctness in the public consciousness. That the matters arising from this conjuncture 
have become particularly urgent is evidenced by the arguably even more stupid 
excesses of ‘post-truth’ politics that have voted the UK out of the European Union 
and voted Donald Trump into the Presidency. It is tempting to jerk the knee and join 
Hayes (pp.    ) in clinging to free speech and academic freedom as absolutes and, 
certainly, there could be some political mileage in doing this. Ultimately, however, 
the battle against the language myth entails recognition that free speech and academic 
freedom can also be reified and idealized. 
Orman presents a startling, but cogent, vision of the politics of indeterminacy 
which recognizes the collusion of determinacy, linguistics and, especially, scientism 
(see also Orman 2016). It is interesting, too – and not at all incorrect - that he should 
recognize in ‘sociolinguistics’, especially, within linguistics, a particular nub of 
reaction. This has obviously struck Toolan (above) too. Of course, for those outside 
the debate about the language myth (read: nearly all other linguists), sociolinguistics 
might seem to be like the People’s Front of Judea. Yet, in the frame of scientism, 
Orman (above, pp.     ) quite reasonably suggests that it is time to 
 
drop the pretence that orthodox linguistics has anything meaningful to 
contribute to the understanding of human communication and instead come to 
the view that linguistics is instead primarily a severe hindrance to that 
endeavour. This would require a fundamental rethinking of sociolinguistics in 
terms of both theory and method, a development which seems unlikely to 
happen any time soon. 
 
This is not unlike the sum – although for somewhat different reasons - of the 
conclusions to be drawn from Deacon (2016), cited earlier, that the study of 
plerematic and cinematic patterning with an engineer’s eye is likely to cloud, rather 
than clear, our vision of what language is. However, while I can agree with Orman 
(pp.    ) that scientism – as a mechanicist perspective, driven by machine metaphors 
with no sense of the richness of agency – is a key driver in segregationalism, I am less 
sure that it is an anti-humanism rather than dehumanized. Certainly, the philosophical 
penchant for determinacy in linguistics is of a piece with its institutionalization. 
Harris (2001) was particularly alert about this issue, noting the scientism that beset 
linguistics from its inception not long ago. When Orman observes that 
sociolinguistics not only failed to reject orthodox linguistics but actively sought 
compromise and alliance with it, there can be little argument. It should be added as a 
reminder that the alliance is founded on the determinacy of the linguistic sign and the 
development of a methodology that not only reiterates that but also serves to 
perpetuate the discipline as a whole. Without promising to find determinate answers, 
how else can researchers in a field repeatedly convince the funding bodies? Indeed, 
one of the most successful branches of sociolinguistics in recent years has been 
Critical Discourse Analysis (upper case is now institutionalized) which is one 
component of numerous successful grant applications in the humanities. 
Yet, there is another political ally of segregation and determinacy whose 
penumbra is just about visible in this book and, for that reason, should promote 
wariness. The idea that the world is ‘constructed in discourse’ has already had a 
relatively long history and has been closely associated with the segregationist project 
of Saussure. Cemented in the much-vaunted ‘linguistic turn’ (Rorty 1967), the idea 
spread through the human sciences and was sustained by post-structuralism with its 
central belief that the only truth lay in the deployment of discourse in specific power 
configurations. Put like this, one can see how the Harrisian insistence on context, lay 
speakers and communication may seem synonymous with post-structuralist 
relativism. Indeed, there is a flavour of this in the introduction to the present volume. 
Pablé (pp.    ) quotes Sartre, for whom “there is no other universe except the human 
universe, the universe of human subjectivity” adding “that the latter position comes 
close to a Harrisian position on ‘reality’; in other words, there is no other view for 
humans than a human view, and this, for Harris, on biomechanical grounds”. These 
biomechanical grounds are crucial in distinguishing between the idea of ‘construction 
in discourse’ and an Umwelt. Pablé does not use the latter term here, but does with 
some considerable accomplishment, and not in passing, in Pablé and Hutton (2015). 
The point, here, is twofold: an Umwelt entails a world constructed by/for a species i.e. 
it is a species-specific phenomenon, not just human; that world is facilitated not by a 
means of communication but by a sensorium, one which – in the case of the human – 
allows extreme variegation and is not based solely on verbality. A “human view” 
(which can never be merely a view, based on one sensory modality) might imply that 
‘humanism’ is appropriate, but such a humanism comes with impediments since it is 
based on a very partial view, on a par with that of post-structuralism, of what 
constitutes the human. 
We need to be careful, too, regarding the assertion of ‘mind’ involved in this 
humanism. Having a mind and knowing that there are other minds with whom one 
can ‘engage’ in communication (Harris 2013 quoted in Pablé, above pp.    ) veers 
perilously close to the idea of the unitary, self-identical and autonomous mind of 
liberal individualism and absolute relativism.  The political co-ordinates of this are, of 
course, problematic; but, above all, we know that it is untenable, much like the 
absolute relativism that is heard in first year undergraduate seminars when some 
participants will repeatedly resolve an issue by stating “It’s just a matter of what the 
individual thinks”. If the speech of the laity is to be taken seriously, along with the 
minds of people, then dialogue has to be conceived as something other than an 
individual project. As Petrilli and Ponzio put it (1998: 28) “dialogue is not the result 
of an initiative we decide to take, but rather it is imposed, something to which one is 
subjected. Dialogue is not the result of opening towards the other, but of the 
impossibility of closing”. This is not a matter of positing an intersubjective basis for 
language so that the indeterminacy of linguistic signs can be instituted. Rather, it is 
the matter of give and take that sustains the laity in its quotidian use of signs. In their 
contribution to this volume, Makoni and Severo suggest a similar process at the level 
of society, with reference to the juridical principle of Ubuntu based on a communal 
perspective. The equivalent in the UK is the ‘common law’, dating from the Anglo-
Saxon period, where cases are decided according to precedents set in previous cases. I 
am insufficiently acquainted with specific recurrent instances of political and ethical 
implementation of Ubuntu, but while Makoni and Severoni’s description gives the 
impression that it necessitates case-by-case dealings, it would seem that there must be 
reliance on precedents, in some form, much like the Anglo-Saxon common law. Put 
another way, integrationists cannot afford to disregard the possibility that there are 
structural effects in social life. 
In respect of this point, possibly the most important statement in this volume, 
is Toolan’s powerful reminder (pp.     , above) that integrationist theory should not 
assume that 
 
questions of inequality in health and wealth have nothing to do with semiology 
in theory or in practice: even the deprived and excluded have language.  I 
would beg to differ, and would suggest that acute practical ‘non-linguistic’ 
inequalities can constrain and even suppress a person’s powers of self-
expressive, creative language.  
 
Toolan points to a serious problem: that the laity may be repeatedly deprived of 
expressive power and unable to contribute to a ‘consensus’ on meaning or a good deal 
else. One argument about the current wave of populist politics in the West is that it 
partly represents the sound of the disenfranchised voice, a vote attracted by the less 
hidebound figures in contemporary politics who say the things that have been 
prohibited in the conjuncture that Hayes so vividly identifies. Whatever is the case in 
recent Western politics, an integrationist perspective cannot rely on the ‘cult of 
humanity’ that Sartre (quoted by Pablé in the Introduction, above, pp.     ) derided,  
the Hollywood-sustained power of the individual or the myth of the informed 
electorate. Instead, a more qualified formulation of the laity and the agent in 
communication is needed. 
 
The laity and agency 
 
In two bold contributions to this volume, both Hutton and Duncker grasp the nettle of 
the self. Hutton, in particular, focuses on “bedrock concepts”, a term for “those 
concepts not easily decomposable into more elementary elements, such as self, 
person, consciousness, meaning, animal” (pp.      ). Effectively, he is talking about 
‘universals’: a concept that, in the wake of post-structuralism and post-colonialism 
has undergone prohibitions. Despite these prohibitions, it is clear that much academic 
discourse in the humanities and social science has tended to invoke universals, often 
either side-stepping their status as universals or being blissfully unaware of it. Indeed, 
bedrock concepts are beginning to escape some of the prohibitions imposed on them. 
Contemporary semiotics, certainly, now puts in a central position certain universals 
such as ‘Umwelt’. Clearly, too, folk versions of universals are preferable to those 
cognitivist constructions which Harris (2008) found to be a much more pernicious 
form of guesswork about the mind than that performed by the laity. Orman (2016) 
makes a similar point regarding folk metalinguistic discourse and folk psychology; 
arguably, Hutto’s work (2006, 2007, 2008) in opposition to ‘Theory of Mind’ 
demonstrates some of the same kind of observations. So, when Hutton states that 
“Integrationism draws on a notion of the self as possessing a mind which cannot be 
deconstructed into modules” (pp.       ), it is difficult to disagree. Yet, he adds (pp.     ) 
that 
 
Integrationism draws on an essentially Christian or Judeo-Christian 
philosophical anthropology in its understanding of the self, which its emphasis 
on communication as a moral activity and on agency and individual 
responsibility in communication. Integration without this autonomous self is 
compatible with a systems theory; integration is after all performed by babies, 
animals, plants, by any life system, or by any system at all, including financial 
systems, transport systems, communication systems, and legal systems (Pablé 
and Hutton 2015). The ‘integrated mind’ (Harris 2008: 109) must belong to an 
autonomous self. 
 
Hutton is aware of some of the problems in what he pronounces on behalf of the idea 
of an autonomous self. He sees the possibility of integrationism as a form of 
humanism in its “rejection of systems theory and its affirmation of human agency, 
individual autonomy and the self-sufficiency and self-authenticating nature of lay 
linguistic practice and lay meta-linguistic insight” (pp.    ). Yet this is a ‘bedrock 
dilemma’ sanctioning some forms of definitional thinking and conceptual reification 
(with regard to the self) and yet critiqueing and rejecting others (everything to do with 
the language myth and cognobabble) (pp.     ). 
Ultimately, Hutton concludes that integrationism, as a humanistic project with 
a socio-political role is undercut by its radical indeterminacy. As a result of this 
reminder of the need to inculcate a first-person point of view, integrationism would 
be, he says “primarily therapeutic”, constantly haunted by the “paradoxes of 
reification and de-reification” (pp.    ). The reasoning is compelling; however, it is 
possible that there is an escape from this dilemma by way of some of the insights 
offered in allied fields, even those for which the language myth is a central sustaining 
ethos. When Hutton notes that the autonomous self which seems implicit in 
integrationism is Judeo-Christian in character, he is not wrong. Coming into being 
fully formed, like a ghost in the machine or like a soul moving from one plane to the 
next in order to settle episodes of communication, such a view of the self envisions no 
past, either ontogenetically or phylogenetically. Although there is a massive challenge 
(despite major progress – see Deacon 2012) in accounting for where language might 
have come from, given that it is such leap away from anything in the world of non-
human animals, one of the benefits of biosemiotics in relation to language is that it 
requires us to consider ontogenetic and phylogenetic development and learning. 
However much human subjects are in media res with respect to signification, certain 
capacities must have had a history. Communication, particularly as it became 
embedded in language, does not appear suddenly: in the human child, it develops in 
stages; in the human species, it has gone through successive phases. Likewise with the 
self: biosemiotics finds the rudiments of the self at the level of the cell - in 
immunological and semiotic modes in which the immunological self operates in a 
‘semiotic’ fashion while the semiotic self operates in the most complex and 
potentially unanticipated ways predicated on a biological impetus (see Sebeok 1979b, 
1989, 1992, 1998 and Cobley 2016: 45-59). The point here is that a self that settles 
communicative interactions did not come from nowhere. Through evolution and 
individual development, it came from incarnations where its autonomy was always 
impaired, never full. It could be said that the autonomous self always bears the scars 
of its fractured upbringing. As such, it may demonstrate tendencies towards 
determinacy even while possessing a degree of autonomy that might make it a 
convincing agent in the communication sphere. 
Harris (2008), has convincingly undermined much institutionalized and 
canonical thinking about cognition, pointing especially to the hygiene it imposes on 
vocabulary to maintain some of its undefendable premisses. However, it should not be 
forgotten that behind some of this vocabulary there is also fierce debate, particularly 
regarding whether the mind is made up of modules or whether it operates according to 
more holistic principles. Perhaps it is unrealistic for integrationism to pursue the ideal 
of the autonomous self and an auto-substantiating mind in light of the fact that minds 
and selves have not always been the same. If I believe this is the case, does it mean 
that I cannot be a fellow traveller of integrationism or, worse, does it mean that the 
only way to be an integrationist is to subscribe to the humanist mythology of the 
unified self? I tend to think not, and the basis for this view is to be found in the 
contributions to this volume. In short, it is the idea that what is at stake is not absolute 
autonomy, but agency – or, rather, that some segregational perspectives have 
banished agency and that fact does not give license to assume that integrationism 
entails absolute agency. After all, ‘communication’, at its very root as a concept 
(leaving aside etymology, which proves very little), involves communing even whilst 
feeling individuality. Duncker writes (pp.     ): 
 
The individual person is capable of seeing themselves in a bigger whole. The 
individual is an exception as well as an element in the ensemble of other 
persons and the relations existing between them. If integrational linguists are 
willing to acknowledge the bigger whole as an open system based on dynamic 
interaction, and to investigate the ensemble of communicating participants 
into which language is complexly integrated, together with their 
interrelatedness, I suggest that it will be possible to develop a different and 
philosophically less problematic understanding of the macrosocial category. 
Linguistic processes are unthinkable without presuming their embeddedness in 
the social matrix, and this means that these processes are also embedded in a 
larger complex based on the simple fact that persons have relations to other 
persons. This social relatedness is inevitable from the very beginning, since 
nobody enters this world unrelated to at least one other person. We are born in 
this way, and to the day we die we are caught up in a web of personal 
relations. In a very concrete sense our life depends on this relatedness as part 
of our integrational proficiency. "If we manage the integrational task 
successfully, we live. If not, we die" (Harris 1998: 29).  
 
Effectively, this is a re-statement of the earlier observation, citing Petrilli and Ponzio, 
on the non-liberal conception of dialogue. Agency does not occur in a space occupied 
by just one communicator. 
Shifting the focus from autonomy to agency would seem also to significantly 
alter the putative relationship of integrationism and humanis. It is not that being an 
agent becomes no more than a disappointing mid-most target, so much as it becomes 
a feature of semiotic freedom with a surprisingly long reach beyond the species and 
within a species’ semioses. Agency across the biosphere has been severely 
underestimated. Hoffmeyer gives the example of  “when a bacterium ‘chooses’ to 
swim upstream in a gradient of nourishment rather than tumbling around waiting for 
the nutrients to reach it” (2010: 34), noting a “talent for anticipation” which would 
have started a tendency to systems with more and more semiotic freedom of this kind.  
Another way of phrasing this configuration is “interpretance”, a capacity that is of 
obvious interest to the integrationist but is used by Hoffmeyer to refer to the capacity 
of a cell, organism, species to distinguish parameters in its surroundings or its own 
interior and use them in regard to significance. The point of semiotic freedom – 
continuity of interpretance from lower to higher organisms – is its potential 
contribution to understanding such cultural preoccupations as adaptability, 
interpersonal relations, subjectivity, art, the good life, value and ethics, unsettling all 
those who would bluffly draw a line between humans and the rest of nature. Semiotic 
freedom is also, of course, at the centre of Umwelten. The equation of semiotic 
freedom and agency seems to be integral to the arguments in the essays by Thibault 
and Bade in this volume. Indeed, Bade offers a clue to what might be the most 
profitable result of the consideration of integrationism and humanism when he writes 
(pp.    ), 
 
We live in the world with others moment by moment, as best we may, 
constrained as we all are by our physical capacities and limits, our social 
situation, and the circumstances that pertain to any lived moment in time. A 
prejudice that insists upon finding a rigidly and exhaustively knowable 
mechanical world behind our lived experience of the world must begin by 
denying the validity of our own experience. To reject that prejudice, in science 
as in life, is to attempt to understand a world that we may love or fear, but 
within which we must needs live together and over which we refuse to seek to 
exercise complete power. To reject that prejudice is also to come to understand 
machines better as the products of human activity motivated and guided by 
human desires, fantasies, fears and ignorance. 
 
In contrast to a vision of autonomy and unity, this statement maintains a focus on 
what Bade and Harris (as well as the phenomenological tradition and second-order 
cybernetics) refer to as “first-order experience”. While systems-orientated approaches 
have tended to bracket first-order or first-person experience, liberal-humanist 
bourgeois thought has made it the default position, rendering it thoroughly natural and 
banishing collectivity except as an entity over which the individual can have 
dominion. In opposition to bourgeois thought, which at all times has effortlessly, 
promulgated individualism (as the common sense of ideology) while constituting 
subordinate classes in society collectively, there has been a poor record of 
appreciating and claiming first-person experience. Perhaps this might be the best job 
that an integrationist perspective could perform: rather than recapitulating humanism 
in the face of the systematisers, it could release first-person experience from the 
constraints of that enforced collectivization whose alibi is the promotion of 
individualism. To put it another way, recognizing the extent and effects of agency in 
semiosis will produce more far-reaching results than falling back on the myth of a 
fully autonomous individual. Somewhat cynically, perhaps, the British actor David 
Jason once said that marriage was like diving into a lake when you only wanted a 
drink of water. Integrationism seeks the life-giving properties of water; it would not 





Having posed these tentative counter-arguments to a marriage between integrationism 
and humanism, one further issue should be clarified. This concerns the status of the 
sign (linguistic or otherwise). Are the foregoing arguments predicated on a view of 
the sign as determinate and determining, fixed co-ordinates which shape and delimit 
subjectivity as the systematisers and post-structuralists would have it? Or do they 
promote the idea that the sign is indeterminate and, in the final analysis, always fully 
interpretable and susceptible to the will of the subject? Toolan (pp.    ) addresses the 
same issue, keeping an open mind, but plumping for human sense-making as grounds 
for doubting that “signs can, in principle and before their emergence on a particular 
occasion (such as the making of integrated sense of a paragraph of writing about 
humanist linguistics contemporaneously with attending to the Tarantella song), be 
measured and recorded”. Without taking any issue with Toolan’s point, I would seek 
to address the question – in the frame of discussing humanism, in light of what has 
gone before in this volume and in this ‘Discussion’ – with reference to the 
suprasubjective. 
As has been seen, Peirce’s famous type/token distinction, as anyone who knew 
his obsession with triadism must have guessed, is only two thirds of the story of his 
categorization in this instance. The three sides of this distinction call for 
‘interpretance’, particularly with the neglected Tone weighing in as heavily 
contextual. Indeed, it is generally understood that sign study in recent decades has 
moved from a ‘code semiotics’ to an ‘interpretation’ semiotics. Part of this 
understanding is based on the growing emphasis not just on the flow of sign to sign 
(semiosis) but on the sign’s constitution as a relation rather than just a configuration 
of parts. A sign is not simply a matter of two parts with a relation to a particular 
terminus. What has been forgotten, for the most part, in the history of sign study, is 
that semiosis inheres in the sign relation itself rather than in its components’ reaching 
of the terminus. The American philosopher, John Deely, drawing on the late Latins 
and Peirce, has been central to the recovery of this memory. The title of a 2002 paper 
by Deely, ‘Intersubjectivity is not enough’, perhaps, sums up the relevance for 
integrationists of the point being made here. For integrationists, intersubjectivity is an 
inevitable part of communication and dialogue (as has been seen) but as a part of the 
theoretical armoury on signification it only serves to guarantee the indeterminacy of 
the sign. It renders the sign user/maker merely as “being-in-between” (Deely 2002) 
sign and terminus. Yet, this is not Deely’s objection to the insufficiency of 
intersubjectivity as a theoretical concept. For him “over and aboveness” is the most 
important feature, the distinctive being, of relation, also according to Aristotle. Deely 
writes, 
 
Relations, however [. . .] are not in the substances that are related. Relations are 
over and above subjectivity tout court. Relations, if they are anywhere in ens 
reale, are between individuals, and ‘between’ is not a subjective mode of ‘in’, 
as ‘in se’ and ‘in alio’ are subjective modes of ‘in’: what is in between two 
subjectivities is in neither of the subjectivities. It is over and above them, 
suprasubjective, if you like, or, more precisely and restrictively in Aristotle’s 
limited categorial sense (limited, that is, to the order of ens reale within το δν), 
intersubjective (2009: 22-3) 
 
Relations, to be intersubjective, must obtain between or among existing subjects, 
while relations of existing subjects to non-existent objects, although suprasubjective, 
fail to be intersubjective (although they can become so in discourse).  
A typical Deely example (2017) distinguishes between intersubjective and 
suprasubjective relations: 
 
We are supposed to meet for dinner; you show up and I don’t (or vice-versa), and 
you are annoyed until you find out that I died on the way to the dinner. At my 
moment of death, at the moment I ceased to have a material subjectivity 
encounterable in space and time, the relation between us went from being 
intersubjective as well as suprasubjective to being only suprasubjective; yet 
under both sets of circumstances I (or you) as the objective terminus of the 
dinner engagement remained suprasubjective (if not intersubjective!) as a 
constant influencing the behavior of the one still living in whom the relation 
retained a subjective foundation as a cognitive state provenating the relation as 
suprasubjectively terminating at an ‘other’. 
 
This scenario seems to indicate a somewhat different definition of signhood from that 
which persists in the opposition of determinate and indeterminate. Indeed, one could 
say that the scenario here constitutes a workable proposal for the radical 
indeterminacy referenced by contributors to this book. That is, the sign – or semiosis 
– on the one hand, consists not in an ‘objectivist’, determinate entity that is sustained 
by intersubjectivity, but in a thoroughly malleable relation that is indeterminate in 
respect of its terminus except insofar as it is understood by agents within the relation. 
On the other hand, the sign is suprasubjective in that its force – like that of fictions 
and the law – endures even when one or more of the subjects is removed. 
So, there is a sense in which the sign, including the linguistic one, existing as a 
relation, is undoubtedly ‘indeterminate’ in that the relation in which it subsists is 
dependent on the negotiation of the speakers. Yet, also, that relation is suprasubjective 
and so, “unchanged in its positive being as relation (i.e., in its existence as irreducibly 
suprasubjective), will be real under one set of circumstances and fictional under 
another set of circumstances” (Deely 2017). If the sign is suprasubjective, consisting 
in its unification of three elements (representamen, object, interpretant), then the unity 
or autonomy of the self engaging in semiosis is neither here nor there – the sign 
remains “over and above” such a posited subject. This observation indicates the sign’s 
status apart from the subject, but it is not to conclude that the sign is indeterminate. 
The sign is still determined by the agency of the subject, as in the settling of the 
relation of our meeting for a dinner date; but the suprasubjectivity of that sign relation 
is such that the sign is not nullified when our putative autonomy is shown to be 
illusory by the affliction of sudden death. As with the lower organisms whose agency 
is engaged in semiosis, each such engagement is an exercise of semiotic freedom. 
However, this is a long way from the kind of autonomy proposed by humanism – not 
just because such organisms are lower forms than humans, a high form characterized 
by a sophisticated Umwelt, but because of the suprasubjectivity of the sign relation. 
Put another way, first-person experience is no guarantee of dominion over the sign, 




The contemplation of ‘bedrock concepts’ that the contributions to this volume have 
afforded has been extremely fruitful. It has amounted, as I have suggested, to a 
grasping of the nettle on the part of integrationism. Given that “the self is the bedrock 
concept for integrationism” (Hutton pp.    ), this volume is timely and crucial. The 
idea of ‘humanism’ that seems commensurate with the speaker’s agency cried out for 
interrogation. Such interrogation is an indication of the rude health of the 
integrationist perspective since the uncertainties and criticisms around what 
humanism may entail in this context by no means erode the broad project of 
integration. Indeed, the importance of first-person experience in communication has 
been underlined. 
For my part, I consider the paraphernalia of humanism to be a problem. The 
themes of autonomy and unity characterizing the humanist project as a whole seem to 
be theological in character - as Hutton suggests - as well as Munchausen-like in their 
lack of foundations. Moreover, they have had a long history in ideology, not just in 
promoting the bourgeois mindset per se, but also fixing liberal-humanism as common 
sense, even in some brands of critique such as Marxism. As long ago as 1963, 
Althusser warned against the “inflation of the themes of Marxist or socialist 
‘Humanism’ as an ideological phenomenon” (1969: 219-48). It was not so much that 
Althusser was condemning ideology, so much as he was concerned with the way in 
which ideology – in which humanism was firmly embedded - threatened rigorous 
thinking. The situation which this edited collection addresses might be analogous. The 
first-person, agentive proposition that is key to integrationism leads us towards a 
position on the self and the mind that may seem inevitable even while it is unsound. 
Scientism, as Orman (2016) attests, with its de-humanized principles, pushes 
integrationism in the general direction of humanism. Yet not all science is the same – 
biosemiotics, for example, while currently marginal within the scientific 
establishment, demonstrates that scientific endeavour can have an interpretative 
disposition at its heart. The same can be said for some areas of cognitive science and 
philosophy of mind. The recovery of agency and communication in the integrational 
imperative might yet be ample in ameliorating some of the parlous consequences of 
the language myth. 
Of course, in the meantime, integrationist scholars face challenges in the 
contemporary global academy. Alongside research that credulously uses codes or 
relies wholeheartedly on the language myth, it is difficult to gain ground in writing 
convincing ‘methodology’ sections in applications for grants. So, as Toolan suggests, 
it might be time for integrationism to consider what can be taken (having already 
ascertained what can be rejected) from the examples of our bedmates. After the period 
of punk and post-punk, I cannot remember how long it was before I went back and 
started to listen to progressive rock again. Certainly, that happened a little before prog 
became acceptable once more. Moreover, I had not anticipated that prog would 
become more than acceptable, with a firm cross-generational international following 
and even a high profile awards ceremony (http://teamrock.com/feature/2016-09-
23/prog-awards-2016-the-winners-in-full). Among some outcomes that were 
admittedly less desirable, punk contributed not to suppressing prog but to forcing it to 
co-exist in a much more diverse popular musical landscape in the decades that 
ensued. My contention in this discussion is that integrationism harbouring a critical 
perspective on humanism might perform an analogous task, challenging the bloated 
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